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ABSTRACT
Lebanon and Bosnia are quite possibly the most divided nations on earth with each
having multiple ethnic and religious populations. Both nations have had disastrous civil
wars that included some of the most brutal killing in the 20th century. With the
intervention of foreign powers both nations were able to set aside their differences and
come to a peace settlement. In both cases the peace settlements accomplished its ultimate
goal of ending the violence. The subsequent scholarship however created unrealistically
high expectations for these settlements to foster a democratic culture and build a national
consensus. This paper seeks to understand the historical origins of the conflict and why
Lebanon and Bosnia have yet to pull themselves from the past, through exploration of the
civil wars, their aftermath and the current political systems. This will be achieved using
primary source opinions and accounts from individuals today and during the peace
negotiations. Sources will also include current patterns of voting and political rule as well
as contemporary newspaper articles highlighting the stagnation in economic growth, the
decision-making process and political reforms within both nations. We find that
ultimately the root causes of these issues stem from outside interference and lingering
tensions between rival factions. The paper will also include a brief overview of the
impact of how nation building failed in Lebanon and Bosnia-Herzegovina and the lessons
we can learn from it.
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SUMMARY
The goal of this work is to explore the similarities and differences in the historical
background to the conflicts in Lebanon and Bosnia-Herzegovina, the resulting peace
accords as well as the aftermath. There are countless sources highlighting the myriad of
problems within both nations and how they got where they are today. However there are
very few that explore the similarities between the two nations. The scholarship tends to
focus on how the peace accords was allegedly responsible for the subsequent stagnation
within both nations; but such scholarship does not take into account the fact that the goal
of peace accords is ultimately a cessation of hostilities, which both agreements achieved.
This paper seeks to clarify those criticisms.

iii

TABLE OF CONTENTS
Page
ABSTRACT .................................................................................................................. i
SUMMARY ................................................................................................................. ii
ACKNOWLEDGMENTS ........................................................................................... iii
TABLE OF CONTENTS ............................................................................................ iv
LIST OF FIGURES ..................................................................................................... vi
INTRODUCTION ........................................................................................................ 1
LEBANESE HISTORY AND CIVIL WAR ................................................................ 4
Early History and Independence ...................................................................... 4
The Breakdown of the National Pact ................................................................ 8
The War Begins .............................................................................................. 14
TA’IF AGREEMENT AND AFTERMATH .............................................................. 17
Lebanon since Ta’if ........................................................................................ 18
BOSNIAN HISTORY AND CIVIL WAR ................................................................ 23
Early Bosnian History and the Kingdom of Yugoslavia ................................ 25
World War Two and Socialist Yugoslavia ...................................................... 28
The Breakup of Yugoslavia ............................................................................ 32
The War in Bosnia .......................................................................................... 34
DAYTON PEACE ACCORDS AND AFTERMATH .............................................. 36
Bosnia After Dayton ....................................................................................... 38
SIMILARITIES AND DIFFERENCES ..................................................................... 44

iv

Similarities ..................................................................................................... 44
Differences ..................................................................................................... 46
LESSONS TO BE LEARNED FROM TA’IF AND DAYTON ............................... 50
Practical Lessons ............................................................................................ 53
CASE STUDY FOR IMPLEMENTED REFORMS: LEBANON ............................ 59
PEACE AGREEMENTS AND REFORM- FINAL THOUGHTS ............................ 63
REFERENCES ........................................................................................................... 64

v

LIST OF FIGURES
Figure

Page

1

Lebanon Debt to GDP .............................................................................................................. 21

2

Bosnia GPD Growth 1960-2016 World Bank .............................................................. 53

3

Youth Unemployment 2014 Bosnia .................................................................................. 53

vi

INTRODUCTION
Since World War II, western nations including the United States have engaged in
experiments with nation-building following civil wars and other disastrous conflicts.
While there have been some success stories, in some cases the warring parties agreed to
the aid of Western mediation. There were two cases in particular where mediation led to
peace settlements that were successful at ending the physical conflict, but led to a system
where reforms could not foster and divisions were exacerbated. The governments of
Lebanon and Bosnia are at peace, however since the fighting stopped decades ago,
underlying tensions remain and the respective governments have been unable create
meaningful legislation while each society has been unable to free themselves from the
memories of past civil wars. If anything, the nations are more divided along ethnic and
religious lines than they were before their conflict occurred. While there have been
extensive studies done into the reasons for this in each particular country, it is important
to see a broader picture to identify the similarities between the two nations, so that
perhaps similar nations such as Iraq or Myanmar, which face ethnic and religious battle
lines today, can create lasting peace. Ultimately two factors are responsible for the
stagnation of the Bosnian and Lebanese governments: foreign influence from both
regional and global powers, and the fact that memories of the civil war are still very real
in the minds of many creating a lingering conflict that may eventually come to a boil.
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The structure of the paper will explore the historical paths that first led Lebanon
and Bosnia into their respective civil wars, including the underlying conflicts and a
historical explanation of both wars. For Lebanon, this is the civil war that lasted from
1975 to 1990, including the invasions by Syria and Israel. In Bosnia, this is the
intervention by North American Treaty Organization (NATO) from 1992 to 1995. This
paper will also look at the peace process that formed the respective governments. The
paper will then take an in-depth look at the peace treaties, the structure of the agreements
between the warring factions and the different outside forces influencing decision-making
at the peace table. It will then illustrate the lasting impacts of these agreements, both on
the everyday lives of citizens, and the numerous attempts at reform from both within and
outside the political systems. Finally, the paper will compare the two nations and their
remarkable similarities while highlighting noticeable differences and conclude that the
sole objective of the peace treaty was to end the war; and that a process of nation building
and democratic culture is a process that occurs over time. With time Lebanon and BiH
can turn into vibrant democracies but this is a constant work in progress as seen in more
establish democracies.
Most sources that delve into the problems and questions surrounding the Bosnian
and Lebanese governments attempt to link the stagnation to the so-called ‘failure of the
peace agreements. Although as stated before, these sources are misguided and almost
exclusively directed at Lebanon or Bosnia, rather than compared with each other.
Although each country has been analyzed in isolation, scholars appear to adopt a similar
tone and argument when assessing Lebanon or Bosnia. First, that the problems and
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divisions can be largely traced back historically to the settlement of their respective
conflicts and even earlier during the reign of the Ottoman Empire. Second, that foreign
nations or entities, such as NATO or the European Union (EU) are often just as much to
blame for stagnation as the politicians with both countries. Finally that sectarianism and
lack of real opportunities to fully integrate is preventing the healing process and social
cohesion. This is the boarder picture, but more specifically there is a wealth of
scholarship for both nations. With respect to Lebanon, the scholarship concerning its civil
war which raged from1975 to 1990 created a change in the power dynamics of the
country, moving from a primarily Maronite Christian-controlled nation to that of a more
politically diverse one. Syrian control and intervention within the peace process and
foreign influence afterwards led to religious conflict, the practices of clientilism are all
parts of a broader picture. Not surprisingly, the scholarship concerning the stagnation in
Bosnia has similar arguments, but the Serbian segment continues to actively seek
partition of Bosnia, which is still possible. This paper’s argument focuses on the three
factors that most sources seem to have in common and to identify the overriding issues
that need to be addressed in any future peace settlement.

THE LEBANESE CIVIL WAR
Division had been a part of Lebanese society for centuries. Geographically
dissected by the Jabal Lubnān, or the Lebanese mountains; by religion, with three major
religious groups and 18 recognized religions; strategically, by foreign conquers partially
seeking to keep the peace and keep control; and by the economic inequality that is
pervasive throughout the region. For the most part, the Lebanese people have had an
unfortunate history, with little self-determination and instead being forced to accept the
rule of outside empires, from the Assyrian and Persian to more recently the French and
Ottoman. Lebanon became a sovereign, independent state in 1943, as the French
Mandate came to an end. Despite Independence the vestiges of imperial rule remained
and some would argue a lack of freedom continues to this day (Henley, 2016).
Early History and Independence
Like Bosnia, Greece and many other countries with a mountainous geography,
this has shaped Lebanon. Apart from the capital of Beirut, most cities are divided by the
primary religion in the area. For example still today, Sunni communities dominate the
city of Tripoli in the north, while Shia groups control Tyre and Sidon in the south. This
system of division has kept the peace for most of the nation’s history since the Ottoman
takeover in 1516. In fact, the Ottomans encouraged this division between the different
groups to keep the peace in their vast and multi-religious Empires. This process was
established with laws that are collectively referred to as the millet system. Coming from
the Arabic word for ‘nation’, the millet system allowed religious groups to promulgate
and enforce their own laws within their communities, allowing for
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a significant degree of autonomy. The Ottoman leaders could still expect taxation and
would negotiate directly with the religious leaders of the community. Historically, this
can be seen as a progressive way to have a religiously plural society but it contributes to
the social division (Joseph, 2011). This division contributed to the mistrust and
antagonism that would slowly stoke the fires of the Lebanese civil war. Even today,
religious leaders occupy a place of prominence within Lebanese communities. Instead of
negotiating with Ottoman governors, religious leaders now negotiate with elected
officials and their peers to keep the peace. This however contributes to the division
within society along religious lines rather than harmony among the religious groups
(Cammett, 2015).
With the fall of the Ottoman Empire in 1918, their grip on Lebanon came to an
abrupt end, however one foreign ruler would soon be replaced with another. Under the
Sykes-Picot agreement of 1916 between the British and French, Lebanon became a
mandate of the French Republic. The structure of this agreement would be important for
the future of the region as it created the current structure and borders between several
Middle Eastern countries as well as helping set the stage for many of the conflicts that
would plague the Middle Eastern to this day. For Lebanon, the agreement would set its
borders but also separate it from neighboring Syria as a different and specific mandate.
For many Lebanese and Syrians, this would be a point of contention that would not be
completely put to rest until Syria gave up its claim to Lebanon in 2008. The conflict
stemmed from that fact that though Lebanon’s population is largely Arab (85%), the
Christian segment represented roughly 51% of its total population during independence.
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Syria’s population, meanwhile, was over 70% Sunni Muslim. So while the Sunni
minority of Lebanon, around 20% of its population, greatly favored a union with Syria,
the Christians and to a lesser extent Shi’a and Druze favored an independent Lebanon
(Maktabi, 1999). What aided in the unity of Lebanon were the historical ideas of
Phoenicianism. The idea put forth largely by Lebanese Christians that instead of Lebanon
being distinctly Arab in nature it is Phoenician, stemming from the civilization that was
contemporary with the biblical narrative and were responsible for some of the most
impressive cities and technologies of their day. Some scholars have credited the
Phoenicians with the creating the foundation of Greek and Latin letters, important
seafaring technology, coastal exploration and the creation of Carthage among other
ancient city-states (Kaufman, 2001). Their impressive history and perceived uniqueness
from the rest of the Arab world, in the minds of many Lebanese, could justify Lebanon’s
independence from a greater Syria or Arab republic more generally. It is important to
note that this line of reasoning would be abandoned when negotiating the Ta’if agreement
three quarters of a century later. France certainly had its conflicts with the Sunni and
Druze groups, but it favored a Lebanon that was separated from Syria; an idea that won
support from the Christian population (Barr, 2011, p. 57).
Though the French parliament voted down a previous promise of Lebanese
independence, as it failed to ratify the Franco-Lebanese Treaty of 1936, the necessities of
the Second World War would help to spur the mandate to end. After the fall of France in
1941, British and free French forces under Charles de Gaulle swept away the Vichy
presence, and while on a visit to the country de Gaulle was pressured to grant
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independence to Lebanon. Many countries including the United States began to
recognize Lebanese independence on 26 November 1941, with a tacit nod from the de
Gaulle government. However the French continued to interfere in Lebanese affairs and
despite the fact the first government was elected slightly less than two years later, it was
almost immediately arrested by French forces, which led to street protests and
international demand for their release. This would prove to be a unifying moment for the
Lebanese of all faiths and in 20 days of their imprisonment, Lebanon would establish its
national Independence Day, 22 November (Traboulsi, 2012b, p. 88-95).
The government structure that would follow in Lebanon would be based upon an
unwritten agreement known as the ‘National Pact’ or as it was known in Arabic, alMithaq al-Watani. To a certain extent the government would borrow from both the
French and Ottoman systems while being uniquely Lebanese. It built on agreements
made during the 1926 constitution and used the 1932 census as a tool to determine
representation of different religious groups. It would divide the country’s political system
upon religious lines and create a system where the parliament seats would be set aside for
religious groups based upon the 1932 population data. This led to seats in parliament
going predominately to Christians, with Maronites holding the lion’s share at a ratio of
6:5. The president and army commander would have to be Maronite, the prime minister
was to be filled by a Sunni Muslim, the speaker of the house a Shia Muslim, deputy
prime minister to be Greek Orthodox and the chief of staff for the armed forces a Druze.
Ultimately this agreement would help prevent Lebanon from a possible forced unification
from Syria but was a blow to the idea of Phoenicianism. The Christian communities were
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forced to concede to Lebanese Muslim communities that they would not seek
intervention from any Western power and keep the Arab and Middle Eastern identity of
Lebanon rather than seeking to replace it with a Western identity. The national pact was
pragmatic and practical for its time but dividing the nation into different religious groups
prevents the sort of pluralism more evident in Western nations. Because there is no clear
majority in Lebanon - unlike in Saudi Arabia or in other Gulf states – consensus building
is complicated (Kaufman, 2001). The National Pact also builds on the legacy of the
Ottoman Empire’s legacy of religion-based guidelines, with certain legal codes such as
Sharia applied specifically to Muslims and different legal obligations for Christians. It
also borrows from the French who helped Lebanon form the 1923 written constitution,
which was the basis for the National Pact and criminal law code as well as forming bonds
of both language and culture that continue to this day. Ultimately, the National Pact was a
pragmatic exercise that was initially seen as progressive. Many had high hopes for the
fledgling nation. Despite this, the National Pact highlights both the foreign influence in
the Lebanese political system and stymies the building of a more pluralistic Lebanon
(Khazen, 1991; The National Accord Document, 1989).
The Breakdown of the National Pact
Years of relative stability followed independence. French troops completely
withdrew in 1946 and the National Pact held firm. The architects of the National Pact the Maronite and first President Bechara El Khoury and the first Prime Minister, the
Sunni Riad Al Solh - were largely able to keep the extreme elements of their respective
factions in check. But there were difficulties that would be later exacerbated through both
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internal and external forces. Many more hardline Sunni groups sought greater unification
with Syria while Maronite groups rebuffed this, attempting to keep Lebanon as
independent as possible to avoid any loss of sovereignty (Khazen, 1991). The resolve of
both groups and the National Pact itself would have its first real test with the Arab-Israeli
War of 1947-48 and be pushed nearly to the breaking point with the crisis in 1958. While
Lebanon was not as fully committed to the conflict with Israel as their Arab neighbors
Jordan, Syria, Palestine and Egypt, the Lebanese military did provide a small contingent
to the Arab League’s Arab Liberation Army (AMA). Two factors contributed to this: the
fact that Lebanon thought itself small and ill-prepared for war against the backdrop of its
larger Arab neighbors, and the lackluster support for the war by the Maronite majority
about which they claimed that “nary a Maronite soldier had crossed into Israel”
(Abramson, 2012). Israeli sources would also cite bribes paid to leading Maronite figures
to keep them out of the war. Still the Lebanese army would provide some logistical and
artillery support as well as allowing Syrian troops to stage from Southern Lebanon at Bint
Jubyal. To not appear weak and be careful of their position in the Arab world, Lebanon
would be the second Arab country to conclude an armistice with Israel, following Egypt.
Despite Lebanon’s small commitment there would be huge consequences as a result of
the conflict. The first major waves of Palestinian refugees coming from territory lost to
Israel would be absorbed by Lebanon, numbering roughly 100,000. A battle for the
status, rights and obligations of the Lebanese state towards these displaced peoples
continues to this day but the UN camps that first came about following the 1948 war
remain. These refugees would play an important part in the Lebanese civil war and still
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occupy an unclear place in the society. Most refugees continue not to have the right to
work and are specifically barred from holding certain important positions within Lebanon
including medicine and law. It would be from this backdrop that the second major
challenge to the National Pact would come, the crisis of 1958 (Hughes, 2005; Khazen,
1991).
Popular dissatisfaction with the result of the Arab-Israeli war led to a wave of
nationalism that swept across the Arab world. One of the first major results would be the
military coup of 1952 where Egyptian President Gamal Abdel Nasser ousted the
monarchy. Nasser would put Arab unity as one of his top objectives attempting to
politically and economically unify the fragmented Arab states to strengthen their position,
shaken as it was from the failures of 1948. His position as leader was uplifted by his
success in nationalizing the Suez Canal and his apparent defeat of the British, French and
Israelis in the subsequent Suez Crisis. Despite his popularity across the region, the
leaders of many Arab states saw Nasser as a destabilizing force and a threat to their
power. The only exception to this was the embattled nation of Syria. Syria, partially due
to threat of military intervention from Turkey and the due to the real threat of communist
takeover, convinced Nasser to unite Syria and Egypt into one state, the United Arab
Republic. For another time there would be a great deal of pressure, particularly from the
Sunni elements of Lebanon to join this union. Complicating the situation, the original
architects of the National Pact that brought stability to Lebanon had since been replaced
by more hardline forces both from the Christian and Sunni sides (Little, 1996). Adel
Osseiran, a hardline Sunni Member of Parliament declared that ‘Lebanon will march with
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the Arabs” and that “anyone who thinks of working for the interests other than those of
the Arabs will have no room in Lebanon”. However on the other side of the fence, the
Maronite President of Lebanon, Camille Chamoun, fought against this notion. He refused
to denounce the actions of Britain, France and Israel nor break off relations with them
over the Suez crisis and strengthened ties with the West and the United States over the
objections Muslim Members of Parliament. Additionally, the assassination of one more
moderate force in the Maronite camp, the anti-Chamoun Nassib Matni, paved the way for
a more hardline approach. With all that going on and the divisions within Lebanese
society coming to the fore, Chamoun met with Western ambassadors of France, the UK
and the US, stating his perilous position and that forces backed by Syria and supplied by
the Soviet Union were threatening to overthrow his elected government. These overtures
were largely ignored by the United States, as it found no serious infiltration by the United
Arab Republic. However, the situation became more serious when on 14 July, 1958 the
Monarchy of Iraq was overthrown. Simultaneous celebrations for the overthrow and
protests against Chamoun erupted on the streets of Lebanon. The situation in Iraq took
the Americans by surprise, who then took Chamoun’s request seriously (Lebanon's first
civil conflict, 2008). The very next day the first American Marines arrived under the first
Eisenhower Doctrine of preventing the communist infiltration of Lebanon. Fighting was
short and decisive with the capture of Beirut airport. Thousands would die, mostly in the
opposition, however the US was able to broker a peace deal in which President Chamoun
would step down in favor of the more moderate commander of the Lebanese army, Fuad
Chehab, once Chamoun’s term ended two months later (Wade, 1984; Shulimson, 1966).
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The 1958 crisis would not be the momentous occasion that the Lebanese civil war
would be 15 years later, but it is important to highlight that many of the problems were
reflections of endemic divisions within Lebanese society. The divisions based upon
religion, national identity and foreign relations. In simply pushing out the unlikeable
Chamoun, Western diplomatic efforts that helped to solve the crisis addressed the
immediate issues rather than the deeper problems with the system. Much like today, the
system can persist with an extremely limited government as long as there are no major
shocks. The 1960s would prove this as Lebanon enjoyed a period of relative stability, but
throughout this time Christians, Sunni and Shia Muslims would come to have differing
interpretations of the National Pact, the Arab identity of Lebanon, the country’s
responsibility to the wider Arab world and how to deal with the growing inequality in the
country (Kliot, 1987).
Outside influence would have a major impact leading Lebanon towards civil war.
The PLO or Palestinian Liberation Organization led by the charismatic and influential
Yasser Arafat was holding increasing sway over the internal politics of neighboring
Jordan. With the PLO acting almost as if a ‘state within a state’ Jordanian King Hussein
was becoming increasingly weary of their activities, as many members of the PLO saw
themselves outside the law. Beginning on 6 September 1970, King Hussein declared war
on the PLO in order to drive them from the country and though the conflict would last
until July the next year, it would be remembered as ‘Black September’. The PLO were
ultimately defeated in the conflict and driven from Jordan into bases in Southern
Lebanon. The PLO and other armed Palestinian organizations had an increasing presence
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in Lebanon in the 1960s, particularly following the Six-Day War of June 1967 where
more Palestinian territory was lost to Israel. The newer arrivals of Palestinians were
under tight control by Lebanese authorities and placed into United Nations Relief and
Works Agency for Palestinian Refugees (UNRWA) camps (Howe, 2005). However the
camps were difficult and costly to maintain and so the 1969 Cairo Agreement helped
alleviate the burden on Lebanon within the camps. The Cairo Agreement allowed
residents of the camps to police themselves carry weapons and control their own
activities. The Palestinian armed wings would be able to recruit within the camps and
conduct raids into Israeli territory. The Kata’ib militia, the precursor to Hezbollah, soon
began to skirmish with the Palestinians. With the increased in border incursions into
Israel from Lebanon, the Israelis would retaliate with bombings and border skirmishes
(Hudson, 1978).
There was a lot of support for the Palestinian cause within Lebanon, particularly
from leftist and communist groups as well as from Sunni Muslims. The right wing
Christian parties such as the Phalangists saw Palestinians as a destabilizing force,
viewing the large influx of predominantly Sunni Muslim background into Lebanon as
creating more conflict internally and externally. The Palestinians for their part had Black
September still fresh in their minds and wanted to avoid a repeat of their defeat in Jordan.
The Palestinians began arming themselves in earnest and attempting to exploit divisions
within Lebanese society in order to keep their position secure. As a result of the
heightened tensions across Lebanon, political parties were forming armed groups
(Khazen, 1991).
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The War Begins
Traditionally the date given for the start of the Lebanese Civil war is 13 April,
1975, but as we can see the divisions within the country over the National Pact, direction
of the country and the ‘Arab character’ and even Palestinian refugees gave rise to a
simmering of conflict long before the major escalation. 1973 could easily be seen as a
start to the conflict with the Arab nations and principally Egypt fighting Israel stalemate
in the October or Yom Kippur war. Israel attempting to put a firmer control on the
Palestinians inside Lebanon infiltrated the country and assassinated two PLO leaders in
the Verdun neighborhood of Beirut. This led to a greater Palestinian militancy within
Lebanon and spurred the Christian parties to increase their own militancy. As clashes
between PLO and the Lebanese National Movement (LNM) or those who supported the
PLO’s struggle and the Christian militias became more commonplace, escalation
continued. The final spark that lit the fires of war in Lebanon was an attack on a Church
in the Ain el-Rummaneh suburb of East Beirut killing four people and then the response
in which a Christian militia killed 30 Palestinians on a bus in the same neighborhood.
Protests erupted due to both attacks and the tit for tat exchange between the groups
continued. A Christian massacre of civilians in Karantina and the Palestinian response in
Darmour further split the country as people from different religious sects travelled to
areas controlled by their religious militias (Khazen, 2000, p 285).
Following the two devastating massacres, the Syrian government under Hafez alAssad attempted to exert its influence over Lebanon by attempting to broker a peace deal
and sending Syrian troops into the country. Even the Lebanese President at the time,
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Suleiman Frangieh, sought Syrian aid, as he believed it would maintain the status quo and
prevent violence. Still the violence continued to escalate and the country became
fragmented into different spheres of control. The divisions in Beirut itself best represent
this: Beirut was divided between PLO and the LNM in the west and Christian based
militias in the east. During this period Lebanon became effectively different states
controlled by either Syria or specific religious based militias (Lawson, 1984).
Like many conflicts that last over a decade, historians traditionally divide the war
into five different periods, with foreign interventions, periods of stability and relative
calm and fierce fighting at other times. The first period, April 1975 to November 1976,
already outlined above, resulted in atrocities perpetrated on both sides. The second
period, from November 1976 and June 1982, saw a number peace talks and conflict
resolution as well as the intervention of Syria and Israel. The third period began in June
1982 with the full-scale invasion by Israeli forces and the aftermath that would last until
February 1984. The fourth period - the 1980s – saw the peak of domestic conflicts
between different religious groups and even within the groups themselves. Finally the
fifth period involved fighting between Christian factions and their different visions for
peace. Throughout the conflict, Syria’s Assad, Israel and to a lesser degree Western and
regional powers attempted to weaken factions, divide loyalties to advance their own goals
(Sune, 2011).
This paper is largely concerned at the nature of the divisions and their lasting
impact than the specific history of the conflict itself. The war brought ruin to Lebanon
like nothing it had seen in its long history. Over 150,000 died and countless more were
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wounded; the entire society was split apart by conflict. Estimates range from 600,000 to
900,000 in terms of those who fled Lebanon during the civil war. The Lebanese Civil
War caused population redistribution and areas of the country became less mixed and far
more divided along sectarian lines with all groups dominating the land they fought hard
for during the war. Television and radio stations would now be more based upon
sectarian lines, controlling the flow of information. Hatred and vengeance for crimes
committed during the war still remains to this day. The war would affect everything from
identity to education, shaping how the Lebanese see themselves. Ghosn has argued that
as part of ending the conflict the Ta’if agreement made very little changes to the national
pact and the divisions with Lebanese society would remain (Ghosn & Khoury, 2011).

TA’IF AGREEMENT
The Lebanese Civil War had dragged on for over fourteen years by the time
leaders from the different religious and armed groups met in the Saudi Arabian city of
Ta’if to hammer out the details of a final peace settlement. The Ta’if agreement,
otherwise known as ‘The document of National Accord’, came about as a result of
exhaustion with the war and the desire for a peace agreement by the United States and
Saudi Arabia with Syria’s influential role behind the scenes. It received support from the
international community though it largely reconstructed the previous National Pact.
(Norton, 1991; Bahout, 2016).
The leadership of Maronite, Suni, and Shia armed groups, what was left of the
prewar government and the international community attempted to solve the crisis that
began the conflict however the government was changed to reflect the current
demographic trends in Lebanon, breaking the Maronite monopoly on power, though they
would still hold more seats than any other group at 34; their Sunni and Shia counterparts
each held 27. The Maronites had been the powerbrokers since independence and,
benefited greatly from the lucrative private sector and contributed to the rampant
inequality that characterized Lebanon before the war. In another concession to the
Muslim community and another attempt to answer the question of identity delegates
chose specific wording to align the country more directly with the Arab world’s customs,
culture and political dealings. In favor of the Maronite position it was declared that
Lebanon would be a ‘free market economy’. To protect the rights of secular parties, the
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electoral systems allowed parties to run in elections and would run against the dominant
forces in any specific area (The National Accord Document, 1989; Boustany, 1989).
The changes the agreement brought were relatively minor in relation to the
damage the war had wrought. The confession based government structure and divisions
prior to the outbreak of the war would remain intact but with the added control of Syria
underneath the surface of decision making in Lebanon (Bahout, 2016).

Lebanon after Ta’if
Lebanon after Ta’if would be in a state of uneasy peace following the agreement
and Michel Aoun’s coup. The peace would be guaranteed by Syria who at least partially
controlled the levers of power in Lebanon until the outbreak of the Syrian Civil War in
2011. Foreign interference, sectarianism and clientlism would make it so that Lebanese
society was stable but the government was generally unable to enact reforms to create
growth and change Lebanon for the better (Traboulsi, 2012a). Scholarship has been
critical of the agreements for this fact however the agreement did end the violence; it
would be other factors that would limit growth (Dawisha, 1984).
Scholars have claimed there were numerous structural issues in the Ta’if
agreement including the retention of political elites and sectarianism, which they argue
led to a lack of pluralism (Hudson, 1999). However scholars missed the point in this
regard, as the focus of the agreement - to end the conflict - was achieved and it would be
up to the local groups and the citizens themselves to achieve these political and social
goals. It is true that following the agreement, power dynamics between religious groups
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continue to be similar and the inability of the system to reform itself may have just been
exacerbated by the diminishing of the Maronite share. The agreement did not aim to
solve the question regarding Palestinian refugee status within Lebanon, although a tighter
hold was placed upon the camps. Many factors remain but with Ta’if we have seen an
end to civil war.
Foreign interference had much to do with the lack of reform in Lebanon and how
the agreement came about. The major foreign player in Lebanon has been chiefly Syria;
their role has nearly collapsed in the past eight years however their influence in political
parties and the power structure still partially remains. Syria continues to retain a close
relationship with the Shia Hezbollah party, which has supported the Syrian government
in their ongoing civil war. The Gulf States, principally Saudi Arabia, support the
influential Hariri family with Saad Hariri as the current Prime Minister. Just how much
influence they had was shown during a leadership crisis in 2017. The Saudis with
displeased with Hariri coerced him into resigning his position as Prime Minister on Saudi
state television; once he returned to Lebanon an agreement was made for him to stay on
and he withdrew his resignation (Dostri , 2017). The episode was a stark reminder for
many Lebanese of the how much control the Saudis had, in determining their own fate
(Shavit & Guzansky, 2017). Iran funds, arms and along with Syria, has an enormous
amount of control in southern Lebanon over the Hezbollah and to a less extent the Amal
parties (Samii, 2008). The United States and Israel have roles to play as well, with the US
promising military and development aid while Israel attempts to curtail the role of
militant Hezbollah with threats and diplomatic support. Foreign influence reinforces
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existing government structures limiting the ability of Lebanon to change as it is pulled in
several different directions (Barak, 2010).
Sectarianism, particularly religious sectarianism, is rife in Lebanon. This is easy
to see given the 18 different sects within the country with three main sects. This division
leads to stability but also creates stagnation. Religious leaders, although not traditionally
elected or even particularly well liked in some cases, continue to play the role they have
since Ottoman times, mediating conflicts and supporting de-radicalization of believers.
Still they have a monopoly over spiritual matters within the community, religious courts
and shape ideas of how a believer should live his or her life, allowing them to perpetuate
the sectarian system. The court system recognizes religious law in civil instances such as
marriage, divorce, inheritance and other small matters. For the most part, the religious
leaders who adjudicate such matters are chosen by religious elites in the country
(Cammett, 2018). This causes perpetuation of system where a few select families who
work closely with the secular elites to calm interfaith conflicts down and restore stability.
The system of courts also discourages interfaith marriage for all faiths and in the case of
Druze made it illegal for a time (Henley, 2016; Cammett, 2015).
This whole system helped to perpetuate a system of clientelism, where familial
ties and sect are more important politically than any other factors. For Lebanon family,
rather than the individual is the most basic unit of society in a patriarchal society.
Economic relationships, political relationships all stem from this idea where families are
involved in one type of trade whether that be a business, type of service job and they
support each other as such (Barakat, 1973). This type of activity is similar to that
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employed by minority groups in the United States and other western countries, focusing
on niche markets. This mentality translates to into voting and political leadership creating
political dynasties that are seldom broken. In general, the political dynasties that are
routinely reelected have less of an incentive to change the system as they benefit from it
and are able to dole out services to their constituents perpetuating that control (Larkin,
2010). Emigration has also occurred in a similar fashion as many time one family
member will migrate and the next ones will travel to the same locations increasing
migration to that specific area. Emigration highlights both the familial structure of the
lack of opportunities for advancement within the society (Joseph, 2011).
Foreign interference, religious sectarianism and clientlism continue to lead to the
stagnation and inability of the Lebanese government to produce effective reform, be it
economic, social or political. Lebanon continues to be hamstrung by these issues.
Lebanon currently has the highest debt-to-GDP ratio in the world at over 150%. Youth
unemployment and underemployment remains high and the government needs fiscal and
business reform to create any lasting growth. The fractured system has yet to produce a
government in Lebanon despite five months of talks. It is evident the system has not yet
overcome the divisions of the past. (Khouri, 2016). Even if a government is formed, then
the system is so fraught with division it is unlikely to force through meaningful
legislation (Barrington, 2018). These problems could not be expected to be resolved in a
national accord.

BOSNIAN HISTORY AND CIVIL WAR
Divided geographically, religiously and culturally, Bosnia-Herzegovina (BiH)
was tied together by the Ottomans, the Austrians and Yugoslavia. Historically it has a lot
in common with Lebanon in terms of geographic landscape, a multi-religious population
and a past full of colonization and division. However, Bosnia has the added pressure of
three different major ethnic groups as well as various smaller ones. The Bosnian Muslims
make up the biggest group in the nation, followed by the traditionally Eastern Orthodox
Serbians and the Roman Catholic Croatians. Their ethnic and religious differences
notwithstanding, these groups have been jockeying for power since the decline of
Ottoman power in the 18th and 19th centuries. Its from here where a divided nation helped
to spark World War One where division continues to this day.
Early Bosnian History and The Kingdom of Yugoslavia
Bosnia-Herzegovina is a wonderfully lush country with over half of the country
forested, along with plentiful fresh water rivers. Like Lebanon, the nation is incredibly
mountainous focused mainly in the center of the country. Following the Ottoman
takeover in the 15th century, the Bosnian Muslim population was mainly based in the
center of the country. The population prior to the Ottoman arrival was considered
Christian and life centered on and around the Bosnian Church, although either the Roman
Catholic or Eastern Orthodox Church never recognized it. After the arrival of the
Ottomans, the Church disappeared as nearly all-remaining Bosnians converted to Islam.
During Ottoman times, Croatians settled mainly in the west and northwest, while the
Serbian settlers came from the North and East. These new arrivals came in to uninhabited
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or sparsely areas and did not come into contact in most areas save the commercial
centers of Sarajevo and Banja Luka. A firm Ottoman hand kept the peace and just as in
Lebanon with the Millet system, each group was able to mostly rule itself with the
Bosnian Muslim population having a privileged position due to their embrace of Islam
and their involvement in the Ottoman military (Lopasic, 1981).
As the ‘sick man of Europe’, the Ottoman Empire would begin to disintegrate and
so too would the privileges held by the Bosnian Muslims. Eventually this weakening led
to a series of rebellions that would shake the Balkans, pressuring the wider European
powers to intervene. Eager to take the spoils and weary of conflict over the area, the
European powers convened the Congress of Berlin in 1878 to decide the fate of Balkan
territories, including BiH. Several Balkan states were granted full independence,
including Bulgaria, Romania, Serbia and Montenegro however BiH was placed under the
protection of the Austro-Hungarian Empire (Jelavich, 1953). While not formally annexed
by Austria-Hungary until the Annexation crisis of 1908, it would remain under nominal
Austrian control until the collapse of the Austro-Hungarian Empire in 1918. With the
retreat of the Ottomans, the constraints placed upon the independent Serbian nation to the
East were lifted. Serbia began to be involved in organizing resistance and influencing
events in the region as it opposed Austro-Hungarian rule and had the set its sights on BiH
and its large Serbian minority for itself. The Austro-Hungarians were weary of
confronting this agitation by Serbia directly as the country was under the protection of the
Russian Empire, so all consultations over the fate of BiH were under this guise. Instead,
the Austrians sought to placate all sides by allowing for a large amount of autonomy on
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the region, more so than many of their other annexed areas attempting to win over the
hearts and minds. Of BiH The Ottomans were also contenders for influence over BiH, as
they still largely had the support of the Bosnian Muslim population (Schmitt, 1930).
Events would be rocketed forward with a visit to Sarajevo from the Austrian Arch
Duke and heir to the throne, Franz Ferdinand. The Arch Duke’s visit to observe military
training was an attempt to put a more positive spin on annexation, with the announcement
of more reforms and autonomy for the region. The world would be however changed
when a young Serbian nationalist by the name of Gavrilo Princip found himself just a few
feet away from his target, mortally wounding the Arch Duke and his wife Sofie. Though
he was quickly caught, this event would lead to World War One based upon Princip’s
connections with a splinter Serbian nationalist organization known as the Black Hand.
While BiH would largely escape the destruction that much of Western Europe saw, the
war would deepen the rivalries between Serbian, Bosnian Muslim and Croatian factions
within BiH. Both the Austrians who counted large numbers of Croats and Bosnian
Muslims as their subjects and Serbia’s ambition to enlarge its own territory and remove
people from other ethnic groups occupying desirable land would encourage this. The
Croatians were already integrated into the Austrian army to a large extent, but to
encourage Bosnian Muslm participation the Austrians created a new unit, the
Schutzkorps. While some Bosniaks joined the regular Austrian army, the Schutzkorps
were a militia charged with eliminating Serbian partisans known as Chetniks. Chetniks
themselves were known for their brutality against non-Serb civilians in previous wars and
were hated by the local Bosnian population. Still the Schutzkorps tended to vent their
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hatred far more on innocent Serbian civilians rather than the hated Chetniks. Atrocities
were committed on both sides but the activities of the Schutzkorps would fuel further
hatred of the Serbs towards the Bosnian Muslims. The fighting in the Bosnian
countryside would flare up as the war slowly grinded its way to a pyrrhic Conclusion,
raising the question of what will happen with the Southern territories of the former
Austrian Empire (Newman, 2010).
Despite their heroic defense, the Serbians eventually broke under the pressure of a
combined Ottoman; Bulgarian and Austrian forces left the Kingdom of Serbia devastated.
Serbia however picked the winning side in the war and would be bolstered by their allies.
With Chetniks and local partisans combined with Greek, Italian, French and British
forces the battle lines and hold of the Central Powers in the Balkans were decimated. By
1918 the Austrian Empire was defeated and an idea long dreamt in the mind of South
Slavs was becoming a real possibility. Representatives from Croatia, Slovenia and Serbia
decided the moment is ripe for a pan-Slavic union, bringing together the three nations
into Yugoslavia, or land of the Southern Slavs. Though Serbia and its Prime Minister
Nikola Pašić were initially hesitant, believing an enlarged Kingdom of Serbia might be
preferable, the three countries agreed after it was decided that Belgrade, the capital of
Serbia was to be the center of power, the King of Serbia would transition to be the King
of a combined Yugoslavia, scrapping the idea of a federation of states. The agreement
between Pašić and the hugely influential Croatian exile Ante Trumbic came together on
the 20 July 1917 in Corfu, Greece (Djokić, 2010; Horne, 1923). Just as in the Berlin
Conference that surrendered their fate to the Austrians BiH, and particularly the Muslim
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population did not have much of a say in the discussions and had this agreement forced
upon it (Dragnich, 1983, p. 7-13).
During the Paris Peace Conference in 1919, the idea of a nation having ‘selfdetermination’ championed US President Woodrow Wilson and this resonated with the
signatories of the Corfu Agreement. Pašić and Trumbić, idea of a Constitutional
Kingdom of Yugoslavia, with universal suffrage and representative parliament fit well
into this narrative giving smaller ethnic groups the chance to band together and find their
destiny. For all the talk of self-determination, Bosnian Muslims were left out of nearly
the entire conversation. While anti-Muslim bias cannot be ignored, it was also due to the
fact that Bosnian Muslims made up roughly 6% of the national population and were the
only Muslims in the Kingdom of Yugoslavia, apart from some Albanians and a very
small Turkish minority (Sepic, 1968).
During the years of the Kingdom of Yugoslavia, the Serbs, Croatians and Bosnian
Muslims sought to protect their ethnicities’ right to land, carve out ethnic enclaves and
expand their influence in the central government. For most historians, the power
dynamics within the Kingdom was generally a push and pull between the two largest
ethnic groups: the Serbians and the Croatians, although the Yugoslav Muslim
Organization also initially held some sway. Bosnian Muslims were keen to keep their
landholdings and some of the privileges they had held under Ottoman rule. They were
partially successful and the nation provided for Islamic law to be applied in some areas
(Norbu, 1999). Following a consolidation of power by King Alexander, Yugoslavia was
split into regions in order to ease tensions between ethnic groups. Although the provinces
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(known as ‘Banovinas’) were supposed to be named neutrally and not create division,
many later on to would use these justify their seizure of land. Codified under Cvetković–
Maček Agreement, the Croatian far right movement Utase spurred the split and was
agitating political violence and an independent Croatia. During this period the Bosnian
Muslims attempted to greatly influence the two regions were they were greatest in
number - Vrbas and Drina Banovina - though were generally at the mercy of the Serbian
majority (Ramet, 2006).
Just as the invasion of the Ottomans, the Berlin Conference and World War One
had before, World War Two would radically shape the future of BiH. It would both
highlight divide between the ethnic and religious groups as well as cement their union
most of the 20th century. For much of its young history, Yugoslavia had a special
relationship with France, for who many of its leaders saw as essential for retaining its
international standing. However with the fall of France in 1941 and bordered by both
Italy and Nazi Germany, the leadership played for time but eventually Yugoslavian
Regent, Prince Paul II was forced to sign the Tripartite Pact, a military alliance with the
Axis powers. The Croatian members of Yugoslavia, particularly the Utase right wing
faction, looked favorably on the agreement however a splinter group of Serbian
Nationalist military officers, backed by popular Serbian support overthrew Prince Paul II
and installed young King Peter II, tearing up the Pact in the process. This was considered
to be an act of war, prompting the Nazis and Yugoslavia to be invaded from all sides;
Germany from the north, Italian Albania from the south and from the East by Axis
aligned Romania, Bulgaria and Hungary (Prusin, 2017, p. 23-28).
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World War Two and Socialist Yugoslavia
World War Two again showed the extreme division from within Yugoslavia and
reopened old wounds. A large number of Croatians showed support for the Nazis and
began to align themselves against the Yugoslav state. As Yugoslavia fell they
proclaimed an independent state of Croatia. For the duration of the war, parts of
Yugoslavia were annexed by the warring powers but the heartland including all of BiH
was part of a German and Italian puppet state, “Independent State of Croatia”. Many
Croatians used this as an opportunity to weaken and oppress any Serbian resistance. Just
as the Austrians did in World War One, the Croatians and Nazis recruited a number of
Bosnian Muslims to fight against Chetnik and Partisans guerrilla operations. Again,
Croatian and Bosnian Muslim Nazi sympathizers targeted civilians and particularly the
Serbian, Jewish and Roma populations committing numerous atrocities. Chetniks would
carry out their own massacres in reprisal against Croatians and Bosnian Muslims (Prusin,
2017, p. 78-80).
The Partisans, led by Marshall Joesph Broz Tito would become the main
opposition to German occupation and would force Germany and Italy to commit more
resources towards keeping Yugoslavia in line. The Chetniks and Partisans would have an
uneasy peace and even came into conflict during the war but both were mainly ethnically
Serbian. After the government of Peter II endorsed Tito, many of the former Chetniks
sided with the Partisans. During the war, there were some signs of unity, particularly for
BiH. Around 30% of the Partisans within BiH coming from Bosnian Muslim or Croatian
sources, and would be part of the national dialogue following the war (Hoare, 2013b).
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The man who would come to dominate that dialogue and reformed the nation with an
iron will was Tito himself (Hehn, 1971).
Tito was born in the Austro-Hungarian Empire, initially serving and
distinguishing himself in the Austrian army during World War One; he was captured by
the Russians and soon after became involved in the Russian revolution. Following the
revolution Tito returned and help lead the Communist Party in Yugoslavia. Though in
opposition the party did have influence and when Peter II fled, Tito established a military
council with the assistance from the Soviet communist international. Tito’s force, with
help from the Soviets, became the main opposition to Nazi rule and was in close
conversation with the Yugoslav government in exile. Despite initial promises, it was clear
that Tito sought a government structure more akin to that of the Soviet style rather than a
return to the Constitution Monarchy or a new Federated Democracy. He did this through
a highly questionable referendum causing much of the opposition to boycott the ballot
over their treatment. It was clear Tito would be there to stay (West, 2011).
Despite early reprisals for crimes committed by various groups during the war and
an iron fist, Tito sought stability (Hoare, 2010a). From the outset Tito and the new
communist leadership sought to learn from the mistake of the Kingdom of Yugoslavia
and brought together the disparate groups and to a certain extent attempting to erase their
independent identities. This was true everywhere, stamping down on Serbian and
Croatian nationalists and forcing unification, whether the ethnic groups were satisfied or
not. One of the first things was the creation of the ‘federal republics’, which were
proclaimed in 1946 and included BiH. The others would be the federal republics of
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Serbia, Montenegro, Macedonia, Solvenia and Croatia. The national ethos also changed
with the idea of ‘Yugoslavism’ promoting a policy of communist centralization both
politically and economically. Additionally Yugoslavian leaders attempted to replace old
ethnic and cultural ideas with a greater ‘Yugoslav’ identity. With the war and the
propaganda of the partisans fresh in the minds of the people, this was met with limited
success. The Ottoman’s attempt to promote an Ottoman identity under their rule was
similar to the attempt by Yugoslavia however both would fail stick (Bertsch, 1977;
Lampe, 1994). In BiH, as with the rest of Yugoslavia, people were far too attached to
their ethnic, religious and cultural identity to see it replaced. Additionally groups such as
Bosnian Muslims saw the new Yugoslav identity as being more in line with an idea of
greater Serbia, which they viewed as a threat. By the 1960s, the Yugoslavian leadership,
understanding their previous missteps and now considerably more independent from the
Soviet Union, began a process known as the ‘four Ds’: de-centralization, depoliticalization, de-statization and democratization all of which granted considerable
more influence to ethnic groups and federal states over the central government (Frankel,
1955). This process and further reforms would make BiH one of the most strategic and
profitable regions of the country and indeed of the contemporary Balkans (Burg &
Berbaum, 1989).
BiH was the geographic center of Yugoslavia and natural its features made it the
ideal location for a number of key industries in Yugoslavia. As it did not border any other
nation, it was the spot chosen for the majority of arms manufacturing In Yugoslavia. The
arms industry brought with it transportation, infrastructure and skilled workers from
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across the nation. As the nation would open its doors with more economic reform in the
1970s, foreign companies would start to invest and by the 1980s there was heavy
investment from companies such as Volkswagen, Coca-Cola and Marlboro. Strong
political representation from all factions in the political arena coupled with economic
growth led to significant decrease in nearly all measure of ethnic conflict. In the 1980s,
BiH was one of the few regions in Yugoslavia that continued to grow economically
despite political deadlock. It even had the honor of hosting the 1984 Winter Olympics in
Sarajevo showing the extent to which the province had become successful. Up until the
beginning of the war Bosnian Serb, Croat and Muslim leaders were enjoying a long
period of growth in the economic system (Zupcevic & Causevic, 2009, p.11).
Despite relative calm in BiH other areas of the nation with clear ethnic majorities
such as Croatia felt that the Yugoslav national project was somewhat constraining. The
independent spirit of Croatia, the connection of Macedonia with Bulgaria and Greece and
Kosovo with a clear Albanian majority were all ethnic conflicts that had to be taken into
account by Tito’s government. In contrast to the vicious war that would occur later on,
BiH stayed away from much of this, though the political representation of Bosnian
Muslims was not as high as their Croatian or Serbian counterparts. To solve these
conflicts elsewhere, the Yugoslav government employed a variety of techniques
including repression, placation or diplomacy. For the Croatian question leadership had to
be reined in from a further split or more; for Macedonia it involved containing Bulgarian
agitation inside the province by to a minimum; and the Albanian majority of Kosovo
were granted more autonomy and the ability to distance itself from Serbia. This required
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some recentralization in the 1970s. All of this was made possible by the strong will and
iron hand of Tito, however on 4 May, 1980 Joseph Broz Tito died, less than 10 years later
the first republics would break away (Djilas, 1995).
The Breakup of Yugoslavia
Tito himself once said "Yugoslavia has seven neighbors, six republics, five
nations, four languages, three religions, two alphabets, and one party" and it was the
figure of himself, coupled with economic growth and political repression that kept it in
line (Norbu, 1999). The symbol of a unified Yugoslavia was gone and the future was
uncertain. Few scholars at the time predicted the total collapse of Yugoslavia, pointing to
its Federated systems, integrated and dynamic bureaucratic structures and the ideological
cohesion (Burg, 1986; Cviic, 1976). There were however, economic problems because
despite high levels of growth there were also high levels of borrowing in the 1970s,
leading to debt burdens when the economy slowed down in the 1980s. The government,
torn apart by division was unable to enact rigorous reform; one solution they employed
however was wealth transfers from the more prosperous in the nation’s north to the less
prosperous south. Areas with high economic development such as Slovenia and Croatia
were easing the burden on Macedonia and Kosovo. This would lead to the breakdown of
communist ideology of unity and create resentment among northern populations
(Zizmond, 1992; Adamovich, 1995).
The economic problems would also lead to the resurfacing of ethnic ideologies
and divisions in society. This would be most true among the three major ethnic groups of
Yugoslavia, the Croats, Serbians and Slovenes. From this climate of economic
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uncertainty ethno-nationalist leaders would emerge the most important for Yugoslavia
and BiH would be Slobodan Milosevic. Milosevic would be the dominant force in
Yugoslavia until the nation’s collapse and even for Serbia itself. Gaining notoriety for his
vocal support of Serbs in Kosovo and Vojvodina he was elected President of Serbia in
1987 and orchestrated Serbian control of both provinces. Additionally Milosevic also
controlled the Montenegrin politics based upon the Serbian majority and a wellcalculated coup. With control of these areas he was able to dominate the Presidential
Executive Council, the power behind Yugoslavia and take effective control of the nation.
The Serbians, Croatians and others all enflamed ethnic tensions by printing propaganda
and releasing targeted statements. In this climate the Serbian portions of Croatia
attempted to secure independence from the any future separation of the country (Silber,
1996). In an attempt to get out before being drawn into a conflict with Serbia and Croatia,
Slovenia, the wealthiest province per capita, declared independence. The Slovenes had
well thought-out plans and with the backing of European powers, they were successful
gaining independence on 25 June, 1991 following a referendum (Zipfel, 1996).
The real fighting broke out between the Serbian minority areas of Croatia between
the Croatians, the Serbians living there and the Yugoslav army, which was increasingly
controlled by Serbia. Yugoslavia attempted to control the whole of Croatia following
their independence referendum in order to keep the state inside its borders but with
international backing, the Croatians achieved recognition and the Serbians were forced to
withdraw. Owing to it’s the importance of arms storage and manufacturing in BiH, both
the Croatians and the Yugoslav army raided Bosnian territory for munitions. Bosnian
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Muslim leaders including President Alija Izetbegović took a neutral stance and attempted
to stay out of the conflict. As it had before, the conflict between Serbs and Croatians
would spill over and divide BiH. Many of the withdrawing Serbian leaders who fought in
Croatia moved into BiH (Ali & Lifschultz 1994).
The War in Bosnia
Bosnian Muslims and Croats desperately sought to distance themselves from a
Serbian controlled Yugoslavia and thus attempted to pass a memorandum on
independence, which was boycotted by the Serbian members. The 1992 referendum had a
64% turnout and with 99% voting in favor of independence. Almost all who voted were
from Croatian or Bosnian Muslim background. Soon after, the Bosnians, Serbians and
Croatians began mobilizing into an all-out conflict. The international community
attempted several times to propose divisions in the country or to seek peace settlements
but the conflict escalated. The better-equipped Bosnian Serbs were supplied with arms,
training and even personnel from the Yugoslavian military won early victories,
conquering Muslim cities and expelling their population. Ultimately the Bosnian Serb
plan was to create a more contagious landmass and agitate for a union with Serbia
(Cruise, 1993).
The war would drag on for three years pitting the Croatians, Serbians and Bosnian
Muslims against each other. Initially the BiH military was somewhat multicultural with
Serbian and Croatian leaders and 30% of the army made up of non-Muslims. The
multicultural nature of the army would change as the war progressed; less than 10% were
non-Muslims by the end of the war. The carving out of territory would take place by
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everyone forcing migration (Abazović, 2010). Just as in Lebanon, massacres would be
committed in order to force people from their land. This was the case on all sides during
the war but most viciously and notably by the Serbians. The international community
attempted to employ a variety of methods to control the situation including safe zones,
but the fighting continued. The targeting of civilians by the Republika Srpska would lead
to UN and NATO intervention, targeting Serb positions to eliminate their heavy weapons.
This emboldened the Serbs to attack the safe zones including the town of Srebrenica, the
town as occupied in July 1995 and over 8,000 Bosnian Muslim civilians would be
murdered as a result (The Fall of Srebrenica and the Failure, 1995). This along with other
attacks led to a more concerted bombing campaign by NATO forcing Radovan Karadžić
and his Republika Srpska to sign a ceasefire on 12 October, which would eventually lead
to the Dayton peace agreement (Szamuely, 2013, p. 290; Daadler, 1998).

DAYTON ACCORDS
The first priority of the United States in BiH was to stop the war. Parties were
invited to a summit in Dayton Ohio where the agreement was to be negotiated. The
Serbians were represented by Slobodan Milosevic, the Croats by Croatian President
Franjo Tudjman and the Bosnian Muslims by Alija Izetbegović. Much of the
international community was more interested in the lasting stability of the area than
anything else, while the Bosnian ethnic groups were looking for the future power
dynamics as well as the territory in control of each party. The important desires for the
Serbians would be for independence of the Republika Srpska, to keep their war gains in
land, property and stolen items. This was also true to a lesser extent for the Croatians,
attempting to consolidate their control over the Serbian areas of Croatia and the Croatian
areas of Bosnia. Izetbegović and the Bosnian Muslims sought a return of lost land and a
privileged position in a future centralized Bosnian Nation (Holbrooke, 1997).
What resulted from Dayton was one of the most complicated government
systems, with compromises on all sides. The country would be divided into two ‘entities’:
the Republika Srpska and the Federation of Bosnia and Herzegovina. There would also
be 10 smaller divisions (‘Cantons’) with the Federation of Bosnia and Herzegovina.
Representation from each zone towards the Central government of BiH would be done
based upon ethnicity, meaning only those in the specified ethnicity can be chosen for that
parliamentary seat. For those decided seats as well only those of the same ethnic group
can vote. This is particularly true for the President as the Accords provided for three
presidents at a time, one from each ethnic group. The presidents collectively serve a four-

36

37
year term but rotate as chairman every 8 months. The presidential system itself
was not new but instead borrowed from a previous system from the 1970s in Yugoslavia
(Tzifakis, 2007). This agreement enforced a kind of segregation that gave each actor a
chance to ‘cool off’ from tensions.
After a few sticking points, all sides were satisfied with the agreement. The Serbs
gave up Sarajevo but gained mountainous territory in the North and agreed to return
refugees and property taken during the war; this would anger many who saw it as a
betrayal of their hard fought gains. The Serbians would still control the lion’s share of the
land with 48% and even gained a little bit, despite their loss of Sarajevo. The end of the
war pleased the Croatians, as much of the Serbian disputes inside Croatia itself were
solved during and immediately after the conflict. The Croatians were willing to sacrifice
some territory within BiH for this gain. The Bosnian Muslims, pleased about the solving
of the refugee and property disputes, would gain the capital and much of central
Yugoslavia. (Boyd, 1998; The General Framework Agreement for Peace, 1995)
To protect the Accord, the international community provided for disarmament of
all sides, integration of the BiH army and an international peace keeping for sent to the
country. Additionally, to protect the levers of power the Dayton Accords provided for a
‘high representative’ to make sure all parties were implementing the agreed terms and
ensure the government was making progress in becoming more integrated and not
passing legislation that was favorable to one entity or ethnic group over the other. The
high representative had veto power over legislation and was a direct connection between
issues in BiH and the wider European community. Initially the mandate was supposed to
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last only a year however it was extended indefinitely (The General Framework
Agreement for Peace, 1995; Majstorović, 2007).
With much fanfare, the Accords were be signed first in Dayton on 1 November
1995 and again with the wider European and global community watching in Paris on 14
December that same year. The result was a political win for the United States and NATO,
however it would bring peace and stagnation for the people of BiH.
Bosnia After Dayton
First and foremost the agreement brought peace in a war-torn Bosnia. This can be
explained similarly to Lebanon in the extent of foreign interference and the role of
sectarianism that underwrote all of the negotiations. Throughout the war, the peace
process and today, different groups in BiH refer to the ethnic massacres of the past, stolen
lands and previous conflicts to justify their claim to lands or argue their right as being
somehow separate from the nation. Foreign interference ultimately led to the Dayton
agreement however it also led a dependence on NGOs, Foreign Aid and extra-national
decision making body. Some foreign nations also encourage separatist tendencies or
attempt investment in only one ethnic group rather than seeing the country as a whole.
Sectarian tensions from the very beginning caused issues in the Dayton accords; the
leaders negotiating the agreement were the same ones likely to prevent its full
implementation or the creation of a pluralistic society (McMahon & Western, 2009).
The Dayton accords introduced perhaps on of the most complicated democratic
systems on a country that for most of its history was accustomed to one party rule.
Structural issues including the rotating three presidencies with each nationality
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represented does perhaps more harm than good as it does not provide a continuity of
leadership or a clear sense of who is head of state at any given time. The electoral system
is strictly divided upon ethnic lines as ethnic groups can largely vote for candidates from
their own group. The entities themselves were allowed too much power as essentially
they govern the country far more than the central government (Zupcevic & Causevic,
2009). Partially this forced segregation can be seen as a positive as it allowed the
different sides to cool off from tensions.
Foreign intervention continues to hamper the ability of BiH to integrate. This was
due to both action and inaction on the part of foreign actors. Many blamed NATO and
occupation forces early on for not immediately pursing war criminals such as Radovan
Karadžić in order to bring the more moderate voices to the center. This criticism was
particularly strong from one of the chief US architects of the plan, Richard Holbrooke.
The lack of a clear exit strategy from the conflict for Western countries in another issue
that still needs to be resolved (Holbrooke, 1997). A peacekeeping force in Bosnia
remains in place to this day and the Office of the High Representative (OHR), initially
created for one-year period remains in place, over 20 years after the end of the conflict.
While intended to provide guidance and control over ethnic conflict the OHR also tends
to stymie local decision-making and confer an international view on local issues
(Zupcevic & Causevic, 2009). These actions make it harder for local leaders to develop
clear local political strategies to solve their conflicts and instead make them reliant on
foreign aid. To a certain extent this is also true for foreign aid, populations are relying on
foreign NGOs for local services that the government is unable to provide. Many of these
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NGOs bring in foreign workers and provide their services with low local ownership of
the services they receive. Much of the criticism leveled on foreign intervention has been
on Western countries creating a dependency on foreign nations for decision-making and
local services however non-Western actors have been important at exacerbating tensions
and divisions (Zupcevic & Causevic, 2009). Each ethnic group in BiH has support from
foreign powers, with investment and business ties, social, cultural and religious ties
binding them together. For the Bosnian Serbs this is both the nation of Serbia and Russia.
Russia has invested heavily in the Republika Srpska, easily being its largest investor with
natural gas power plants and other lucrative business deals. In 2014, Russian investment
was about $110 Million USD, nearly half of all foreign direct investment in BiH (Russia
the most important investor in B&H, 2014). The Eastern Orthodox traditions also bring
them together, with deeply felt ties culturally between the two. Russia and Vladimir Putin
has supported paramilitary organizations and trained Bosnian Serb militias (Mironova, &
Zawadewicz, 2018). This one-sided support only further divides the BiH (Colborne,
2018). This has also been the case for the Federation of Bosnia-Herzegovina, seeing
tourism and investment from Turkey and other Muslim Gulf states. Arabic, not a
language native to BiH can be seen all over the Federation as gulf tourism grows building
shopping centers, hotels and even a world class resort (Brunwasser, 2016). While
economically important these states also provide funding for the construction and
expansion of Mosques throughout the country. Foreign funding for these mosques is
contentious, as some suggest they encourage extremist Salafist Islamic views. This
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investment is absent in Serbian regions and is concentrated on the Muslim areas (SitoSucic, 2016).
Foreign intervention is not always negative with investment from European
countries such as Austria and Switzerland attempting to spread investment and encourage
growth. Some of these attempts have been hamstrung by issues of law; corrupt officials,
taxation and political instability. Both entities government officials have an incentive to
keep economic control in the hands of local officials rather than the state. This allows
them to dole out benefits to supporters and keep their lucrative positions. Only when it
came to the prospect of ascension to the European Union were the leaders of the different
factions able to agree to certain reforms. They agreed to give up some of their ability to
tax to the central government and allowed more control to the central government
military (Zupcevic & Causevic, 2009). Despite this further efforts to reform the system
have been blocked by different forces within the government with the Serbians being
particularly against such reforms (Brljavac, 2011; European Commission - Fact Sheet –
Bosnia, 2018).
Sectarianism is nothing new when it comes to BiH; it continues to hamstring
development. Few would suggest that the political climate has even achieved pre-war
levels. How sectarianism has changed since Dayton has been through the method with
which power is shared. Power is devolved to the two entities and most contend that they
have more control and power than the state. Divided upon ethnic lines the entities have
the ability to negotiate with foreign companies, control local state owned enterprises and
their own electrical grids. There is little incentive for ethnic leaders of each group to
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pursue a lessening of tensions. The parties that prosecuted the war are many of the same
parties that are in power today. The Bosnian Muslim President who has been in power
since 2010 Bakir Izetbegović is the son President who led the Bosnian Muslim cause
during the war, Alija Izetbegović. The Serbian President Milorad Dodik served as a
wartime member of parliament for the Republika Srpska and ran of a platform advocating
independence from BiH and a breaking of the Dayton accords. The Croatian member
Željko Komšić, is the only one that is not particularly partisan, though both he and he
predecessor, Dragan Čović have been involved in corruption scandals involving majority
Croatian companies (Belloni & Deane, 2005: 219-243; Tamkin, 2018).
Sectarianism has contributed to many of the current tensions. Scholarly writing from
different ethnic perspectives often attempts to blame the war on the other for what they
see as historical wrongs. This ranges from the Kingdom of Serbia and their territorial
claims prior to the Ottoman Empire, to the atrocities committed on all sides during the
two World Wars (Sacirbey, 1996). Propaganda in posters, songs and writings during the
war encouraged hatred other groups as a way to gain support for their cause. This
translated into a country most nationals, Serb, Croatian and Bosnian Muslim all sought to
live in the territories controlled by their ethnic groups rather than risk being ruled by the
other. Most schools in the nation are divided by ethnicity they are often taught very
different histories, in different languages or dialects (Hedges, 1997). This exacerbates the
divide and leads to mutual distrust undermining efforts at reform and making future
change less likely to occur. This also creates a problem for those not a part of the three
main ethnic groups. They tend to have little say in political matters and are unable to
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elect people to represent them (UN Committee on the Elimination of Racial
Discrimination, 2018; Karge & Batarilo, 2008).
The end result of foreign intervention and sectarianism are causing BiH to remain
stable but stagnant. Major reforms needed for the country’s membership to the European
Union have not occurred as well as basic reforms to encourage a healthy business and
investment climate. Youth unemployment in BiH stands at over 54%, the second highest
in the world and youth migration away from the nation continues to be a significant brain
drain. Unemployment is high compared to the region and stands at over 18% (World
Bank Development Indicators, 2018). The ethnic tensions that have built up in the
country contribute to low voter turnout at 53% in the last election and political
participation. The initial goal of the two entities was the idea that they would function
similar to states in the United States however in practice their power structure have more
nations within the European Union, with perhaps even more independence (PBS News
Hour, 2010). How the 3 Presidencies are elected with votes based upon ethnicity provide
for a system that encourages Presidents to look to the needs of their ethnic group over
that of the good of the nation as a whole (Holbrooke, 1997). Following the Dayton
Accords, BiH has been a peaceful place and though problems remain, it is up to local
actors to bridge the divide and create a culture of camaraderie, democracy and national
unity (Spanu, 2018).

SIMILARITIES AND DIFFERENCES
The similarities of Lebanon and BiH run deep. They share a history of devastating
civil wars that that both countries struggled through have been instrumental in shaping
both nations. Both states that continue to struggle with their past, the agreements that
achieved peace and their place in the modern global world. There are many differences to
their national experience and continue to be but how their respective conflicts ended
created similar situations of peaceful stagnation. This is based upon similar interference
from foreign powers in their affairs and the sectarianism rife within both societies. There
are some substantive differences as well in power dynamics between groups, the goals of
foreign powers and which foreign powers are interested and their respective histories.
Similarities
The biggest similarities the nations share are the fact that both of them went
through division and conflict in the recent past. Their respective civil wars built on some
common aspects of their history. One historical aspect that Lebanon and BiH have in
common is their connection to the millet system of Ottoman division. Each religious
community in the nation being left largely to their own devices, led to more diversity in
the nations in terms of religion and cultural practices. Both nations also were subject to
imperial rule even after the fall of the Ottoman Empire with the Austrians and Germans
for BiH and the French for Lebanon. This hampered their development of independent
government structures and a common political framework (Bieber, 2000).
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Their identities are pulled in different directions with Muslim communities
pulling toward Gulf States and Catholic communities pulling towards the west and
Orthodox looking towards Russia. These pulls help to stoke and maintain division within
both societies and are encouraged by foreign interference. Saudi Arabia helps their Sunni
partners economically and influences them culturally and politically; Russia plays a
similar role for the Serbians in BiH. Other foreign powers influence various groups
within Lebanon and BiH sustaining the divisions and creating less of a chance for
dialogue (Colborne, 2018; Barak, 2010).
Religious sectarianism is another thing they have in common. Each nation is
multi-religious and though the dynamics are different the resulting division is the similar.
Religious leaders tend to create stability by negotiating with each other and attempting to
limit conflict but also encourage the development of independent communities and
identities as well as discourage interfaith marriage and other forms of pluralism
(Cammett, 2015).
Another similarity they share is how the media is divided in each state. In
Lebanon, while all forms of media are available each religious community and even some
parties have their own television and radio stations. In BiH entities have wide ranging
powers to regulate the media and the different languages spoke throughout the country
create a media environment that is tailored to specific ethnic groups. This helps to sustain
divisions by providing limited options for finding information about local issues and
news (Hudson, 1999).
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Stagnation and ineffectual governance is another factor that they both share. The
structural issues in both the Dayton accords and the Ta’if Agreements create an
environment where the causes of the conflicts are not resolved but rather put on hold as
the divides continue to prevent meaningful change. The agreements were never intended
to focus on these long-term issues; it rather accomplished their goal of ending the
violence. In Lebanon the divisions of control based upon religion stayed similar prior to
the war, as did the concentration of power in a select elite based upon family ties
(Henley, 2016). In BiH the divisions were exacerbated by the concentration of power in
the entities in which power is elected solely by ethnic ties. In both nations there is a
continuation from the wartime leadership into peacetime. This fact means that they have
little incentive to alter or change a system where they continue to hold all the cards. This
stagnation continues to stymie necessary economic, social and political reforms. The
result has been mass emigration from Lebanon and BiH creating a diaspora with millions
in Germany, the United States and all over the world (Belloni & Deane, 2005; Abdallah
& Barrington, 2018).
Differences
There are substantive differences between the situation in Lebanon and BiH.
Many of the differences are minor, based upon regional differences such as a European
outlook for BiH and a Middle Eastern outlook for Lebanon. For BiH the divisions are
largely based upon what they see as ‘ethnic groups’, which also have religious
differences where as in Lebanon the differences are mostly religious, and the cultural
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differences not as pronounced as the different groups share the same language and most
of the same customs.
Some changes can be traced to historical developments, such as the fact that BiH
is a very new nation that experienced on party rule for most of its existence. Under
communist rule democratic institutions were suppressed which made it that much harder
for the population to transition towards a constitutional democracy. In Lebanon, they
have had a period of statehood from 1943 prior to their civil war while in BiH the conflict
began from the very birth of their modern state. The perceptions of their historical past
also influenced their own self-concept. There were few voices during the Lebanese Civil
War that ever called for the partition or dissolution of the nation. In fact, for many
Lebanese, Sunni’s included the war solidified their separation from Syria and their
uniqueness as a nation. This can be seen in contrast to clear desires for independence or
union with another nation from BiH. The Bosnian Serbs from the very beginning were
agitating for independence or a union with Serbia (Bieber, 2000). They continue to voice
this opinion with the recently elected Serbian leader Milorad Dodik winning on a
platform of separation from the rest of Serbia. The concept of nationhood is clearly
stronger in Lebanon than BiH (Colborne, 2018).
Historically as well generations of massacres and fighting are more vivid in the
minds of Bosnians of all ethnicities. Massacres by the Bosnian Serbs during the war such
as Srebrenica still are open wounds but also Bosnian Muslim and Croatian atrocities of
during the two World Wars are felt. The most recent conflict in BiH, though significantly
shorter than the war in Lebanon had significantly more casualties with far fiercer fighting
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over territory. The teaching of history in schools exacerbates the memory of divison and
difference as well. Neither country attempts to tackle the war in their national curriculum
objectively. In Lebanon the war is simply not taught at all, that period of Lebanese
history is left to the family (Maktabi, 2012). For BiH what version of events you get
depends on which ethnic group you belong to and which community you attend school.
Serbian, Croatian and Bosnian Muslim histories differ on issues of blame, the
significance of certain events and who is right or wrong (Karge & Batarilo, 2008). These
differences compound to show how the divisions are more pronounced in BiH than
Lebanon.
In the political arena Lebanon has a less complicated electoral and governmental
system, allowing for more flexibility. In the Federation of Bosnia-Herzegovina and
Republika Srpska elections are based upon ethnicity meaning a Serb can only vote for
Serb candidates and a Croat for Croatian candidates additionally parliamentary seats are
allocated based upon ethnicity so only Bosnian Muslims can be elected in certain areas.
This is only partially the case in Lebanon where a Maronite can vote for a Shia, Sunni or
secular party rather than a Maronite. Electoral seats however are still assigned to
particular sects. This has allowed elections in Lebanon to be more dynamic and has led to
some grass roots movements, particularly in the most recent 2018 election, though none
have achieved particular success as of yet (Bieber, 2000; Wittes, 2018) One of the
questions in the war that Lebanon has to come to grips with and BiH does not is the issue
of refugees. Around 1.4 million Palestinian refugees still reside in Lebanon, which
compared to a Lebanese population of roughly 4.5 million is staggering. One of the
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delicate balancing acts the government continues to face is how to deal with this
population. Following the far Lebanon has put strict controls on the refugee camps, their
ability to gain citizenship work or otherwise. Lebanon will face future challenges for
them that if US aid for UNRWA, the UN mission that oversees that camp dries up, how
will they deal with the needs of such a large population (McDowall, Basma, & Kanaan,
2018).

LESSONS TO BE LEARNED FROM TA’IF AND DAYTON
Those who sat down in Dayton and Ta’if came to an agreement about an end to
the fighting, which was ultimately the goal they sought. They were successful at ending
the violent conflicts between them, as there has been no evidence of sectarian violence
since. Despite the successful implementation of both peace accords they required foreign
peacekeeping forces, which are still present in Bosnia to this day. There were also some
initial obstacles in ending the violence but these were quickly overcome. In Bosnia there
had been criticisms of the speed at which NATO pursued war criminals, however the
majority of suspected criminals were eventually brought to justice. In Lebanon, the two
initial stumbling blocks towards peace in the Ta’if accords were the inter-Christian
conflicts of the early 90s and the continued militancy of Hezbollah. Once resolved armed
conflict ceased to be a major concern in the stability of Lebanon and BiH. This is in
contrast to numerous examples throughout history of peace accords failing to live up to
the task of ending violence. Notable examples include the Treaty of Versailles, ending
World War One and the Armistice agreements of 1949 ending the Arab-Israeli War. Both
peace accords saw a resumption of conflict soon after. They are important examples but
history is rife with others in which a lasting peace was not achieved.
Critics of Dayton and Ta’if should distinguish between the goals of peace accords
in general – which is to end violence - from nation building and the development of a
grassroots democratic culture. By aiming to end to the violence, peace accords create the
conditions for nation building to begin; but there is a clear distinction between the two.
Nation building is an ongoing process that takes decades to construct and sustain. It
50
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involves setting up institutions that create accountability and engage in decision-making.
Democratic culture also changes and develops over time, as democratic nations are
forced to adapt to different economic, social and technological changes that are occurring
globally. Once established, the principles of democracy require to be upheld with every
political administration and generation. The critics of these agreements need to
understand the distinctions between these goals as well as the time frames with which
they operate under.
Expectations of peace accords are always high and this includes the agreements
ending the conflicts in Lebanon and BiH. Many scholars have been critical of the
agreements as failing to foster democratic institutions however historical backgrounds of
these conflicts go back centuries. The Millet System of the Ottoman Empires divided
religious groups and helped to develop unique identities and communities within nations.
Whatever good intentions foreign actors had in developing peace accords, any agreement
negotiated over a period of months cannot sweep away ingrained perceptions and
animosities. The agreements can however establish a peaceful coexistence between the
different groups and in this way we can see the Dayton and Ta’if agreements as a
success. No major conflict has broken out between the different sectarian groups since
the signing of the accords. In another way the overly high expectations the scholars,
international community, and even some who negotiated the accords had for future
outcomes in the nation can be seen as a failure. This lack of historical understanding has
led to international solutions to domestic problems a scholarship particularly critical of
both accords. (McMahon & Western 2009)
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With the stark divisions between the sectarian groups within Lebanon and BiH,
it’s clearly apparent that nation building and the creation of a national consensus will take
some time. The distinction needs to be made is that nation building is a process that
occurs over decades and sometimes centuries to create governmental infrastructure. This
includes national organizations, the development of government services and programs as
well as the development of a national identity that is pluralistic rather than sectarian in
nature. Even for societies that seem successful in this regard need to revaluate norms and
alter governmental programs. (Feldman, 2004)
The fostering of a democratic culture and maintaining it is one of the most
difficult tasks a nation can face. This is just as true for well-established democracies such
as the United States and France as it is for the nascent democracies of Lebanon and BiH.
It depends on the citizens; many of the founding fathers of the United States were keenly
aware of this. Benjamin Franklin, following the signing of the constitution, was asked
what type of government we had and responded “A republic … if you can keep it."
Democratic culture can take decades and even centuries to develop, with amendments
needed to alter or change the rules as attitudes and realities change. It would be
impossible for any peace accord to establish democratic culture immediately; but peace is
required for a democracy to grow and be maintained (Burger, 1988).
The critics of Dayton and Ta’if were correct in stating that concrete reform has
failed to materialize in the two nations since the signing. Perhaps a more accurate
criticism of the accords would be that they lack clarity concerning the point that it was
never about nation building and democratic culture in the first place, but that it was about
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stopping the violence. The fighting has subsided since the accords were signed and we
can thank the extensive work done in Dayton, and Ta’if and the hard choices made by the
warring factions for this. The accords accomplished their goal but nation building and the
development of a democratic culture takes time.

Practical Applications
While peace accords alone are unable to bring sustainable reforms there are
solutions for countries beleaguered by sectarianism, hamstrung by their political structure
and beset by foreign interference. A better understanding of the history of multi-religious
and multi-ethnic nations such as Lebanon and Bosnia provides practical lessons in what
not to do and informs us on ways unity is better achieved. The end to the violence is the
necessary first step but to achieve more lasting unity nations need to adopt reforms
designed to create conditions where pluralism flourishes. The practical lessons that we
can learn from are; the importance of political, social and economic interaction between
various groups as well as how crucial insuring that governmental structure is based upon
unifying values rather than religious or ethnic division. Applying these lessons reduces
the likelihood of violence in the future by bridging the divide between different groups.
These lessons can be applied to well-established nations and pluralities such as The
United States, France and Germany that have more recently witnessed divisions within
their societies intensify with the rise of populist leaders. Just as easily the same reforms
can apply to developing nations still divided along sectarian lines such as Iraq, Myanmar
and Syria.
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As explained, the government structures of BiH and Lebanon limit the possibility
of unity through their strict adherence to divisions based upon confessional or ethnic
lines. These structures force and maintain a sectarian division. Countries that have been
able to achieve a more pluralistic character such as the United States, Canada and France
have eliminated adherence sectarian structures such as these. To achieve more pluralism
in a society it is necessary to remove key obstacles such the allocation of seats based
upon an ethnic or religious division. This provides citizens with the freedom to make
their own choices politically. Cultivating a sense of political identity is also important,
first as a citizen of a nation rather than as a member of a particular ethnic or religious
group. This inclusive sense of national identity serves a bridge between other divisions
that might arise.
In Lebanon and Bosnia voter turnout and political participation is low. Many feel
as if their vote counts for little and resign themselves into believing that real change will
not eventuate from active political participation. In Bosnia and Lebanon this has been due
to the fact a voting ballot is determined by a person’s religious or ethnic affiliation. This
creates a political climate where the elected leaders are only responsible for their ethnic
group rather than focused on the good of the nation as a while. Still, voter turnout and
political participation is low in many modern democracies, such as the United States. To
help elected leaders be more accountable to their constituents regardless of ethnic group,
reform needs to occur. A simple reform would be to eliminate political identification of
individuals based upon any classification. This would include ethnic or religious
affiliation, which ties back into government structure, for if the divisions are enshrined
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into law the tensions will remain. A more important and longer lasting solution is to
change the voting system itself. Two methods to alter the voting system would be greatly
impactful. The first method would be to introduce a preferential or ranked voting system
where candidates are ranked based upon order of preference. Adoption of this would
encourage candidates and elected officials to pay attention to minority views. This system
has worked well in some nations such as Scotland and Australia where it helps create
more opportunities for discussion. The second method would be the introduction of
compulsory voting where citizens are required by law to vote. While this would increase
voter turnout it would also foster a sense of civic duty. Programs of compulsory voting
have been a mainstay of Belgian democracy for over a century but also in place in 22
countries around the world, showing its longevity and effectiveness.
One other political and social issue that is a thorny subject in nations around the
world is the legality of religious courts. In Lebanon, religious courts can be used to
adjudicate on civil topics such as marriage, divorce and inheritance. However, in other
countries such as Saudi Arabia they provide the national legal code. For Lebanon,
religious court rulings are binding and can have a lot of sway over community decisions.
Any nation that provides a separate legal system only serves to divide their society. In
Lebanon, this makes marriage between different groups less likely and helps perpetuate a
regional divide. A solution would be to eliminate the binding nature of this court system
and provide for the common welfare of all groups through civil law with legislation
mandated by a pluralistic, multi-ethnic and multi-religious parliament.
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The story of Lebanon and Bosnia has shown the importance of social interaction
on a regular basis. Divisions in schools perpetuate the divisions in the wider society. An
education system that avoids teaching about divisive topics such as Lebanon’s or the
teaching a biased history bolstering partisan views in the case of Bosnia only further
divides society. Mandating a specific curriculum of national reconciliation would help
ease these divisions. Developing such a curriculum would force groups to sit down and
discuss the problems within society, their shared history and their shared culture in a way
that creates climate fostering a sense of national unity. In Myanmar if national schools
were able to teach the history of the predominately Muslim minority Rohingya people
along with the majority Buddhist Bamar and show the peaceful interaction between them
it would allow for cultural understanding and tolerance. While Myanmar is one example,
every country attempting to overcome divisions could benefit from a universal and more
inclusive school system including Iraq, Afghanistan and Pakistan to name a few. One of
the ways in which the United States and others have been more successful at creating a
sense of pluralism has been through universal education. It should be noted that there are
limitations to this in many countries due to a lack of availability for financing of schools
however an agreed to curriculum would still be a powerful message to all groups.
Media is another area where we can learn from the lessons of BiH and Lebanon.
While access to media in both countries is universally available, most of the population
still gravitates towards the media that represents their ethnic or religious group. This
reinforces the partisan beliefs of that group at the expense of ideas and opinions of others.
This is becoming more common globally as ‘filter bubbles’ has been a problem in the
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United States as well. There is no simple solution to filter bubbles but some proposed
ideas would be, promotion of media celebrates unique cultures within a nation and their
contributions to society as a while. Another would be to make different television
channels available regardless of region, promoting news in various languages and
attempting to understand rather than outright criticize ideas from opposing groups. This
would help increase dialogue people who otherwise would be confined to their ‘filter
bubble’
Not only politically and socially but the divisions within Lebanon and BiH were
also economic. The division of economic control was central to the beginning of conflict
for both nations. Increasing opportunities for employment and economic mobility is key
to preventing any future conflict. One way to promote this is through economic
interconnectedness or regional economic unions. The effectiveness of such agreements
was most notably proven by the success of the European Union. This economic and
political block has been credited with preventing conflict between France and Germany
over resources and political influence and has been effective since the end of World War
Two. If properly implemented, an economic union with its neighbors could lessen
international conflict but also promote industry and understanding between groups within
Lebanon and Bosnia. Attempts have already been made in other parts of the world to
implement free trading blocs. The European Union, Mercosur in South America and
African free trade agreements are all well documented examples. All of these unions have
met with success in promoting economic growth. Such an agreement would have an
added benefit in the case of Lebanon. If Lebanon entered into an economic union with
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Syria, Iraq or Israel there would likely be less foreign interference in their affairs as the
rules and laws governing the union generally apply to all members equally. Still a
criticism would be that such a union would diminish the sovereignty of any nation that
enters into it.
No peace process would be able to introduce such wide-ranging reforms, which
take time and require avid support from the population. Peace processes in their nature
are compromises and in many cases led by outside influences. Under such circumstances
it would be impossible to harness cross sectarian support for the necessary systemic
reforms. There are clear strengths and limitations to each of these reforms they are
however based upon the historical study of the conflicts and divisions within Lebanon
and Bosnia. The amendments to the governmental structure as well as the political,
economic and social reforms proposed can serve to blur divisions within nations. They
foster a sense of national identity and promote the building of a democratic culture. Such
reforms are just as important in well-established democracies as they are for developing
ones. This includes; equal justice for all citizens, voting reform with the introduction of
preferential and compulsory voting, reform to religious influence in civil law, education
and media reform as well as pursing economic unions with similarly situated nations. The
final part will take a look at how such reforms might impact a divided sectarian nation
such as Lebanon.

CASE STUDY FOR IMPLEMENTED REFORMS: LEBANON
Though beset by division Lebanon remains one of the most vibrant places in the
Middle East. If it were able to achieve a higher level of political participation and provide
for a more pluralistic society it would be better equipped to harness its geographic
location as well as its vast highly educated population. In order to achieve this it would
enact a number of different reforms, targeting governmental structure, the political
process as well as social and economic reforms.
Structural reform would need to be enacted first, changing the constitution to
destroy the religiously mandated nature of the political office. The effect would be an
increase in competition for political office at all levels as positions of government could
no longer be considered ‘safe’ for religious groups. Spending for political office would
also increase unless limited by legislation. Appeals to the Lebanese diaspora, many of
which retain citizenship and voting rights would also increase with political candidates
visiting areas with substantial amounts of foreign-born Lebanese citizens such as Brazil
and the United States.
These structural reforms would need to be accompanied by reforms to the voting
system. Introduction of compulsory voting would increase the voice of several groups
within the country that were previously limited in their representation by the structure of
the government. The Shia, Sunni, Druze and Armenians would all see their share of the
representation increase at the expense of the Maronite community. Social, political and
economic issues would progressively swing towards the left in a similar way to that of
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other countries that enacted compulsory voting. A dialogue for programs allowing the
incorporation of Palestinian refugees into Lebanese life, pathways to citizenship and
gainful employment would be another left leaning policy the voters might adopt due to
compulsory voting. Preferential voting would also need to be introduced to allow for
minority candidates to have more of a chance at representation. The effects of this would
lead to more compromise candidates and those from smaller religious groups would have
more of a chance at success than within the current voting structure. Presidential and
parliamentary candidates would be forced to be more concerned with their ability to pass
meaningful legislation for the good of the country than just providing for their particular
religious group.
The changes to the government structure and voting would be the most important
factors in creating unity within Lebanon substantive reform however would need to go
further to achieve lasting success. For a level of national reconciliation to occur there
needs to be a free discussion of the activities during the Lebanese civil war between
former combatants. This dialogue would allow for the teaching of the history of the war
in schools and the ability to pursue a more objective view of the conflict. Fostering an
understanding the causes and divisions with the society in order to prevent a similar
conflict from occurring in the future.
In the same regard, media reform would need to be addressed as well. The active
promotion of different viewpoints, explanations of the different platforms electoral
candidates support politically all are positive reforms increasing the level of cooperation
between factions. This would initially need to be funded through the state and political
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NGOs however could be more broadly opened up to the private sector later on as demand
for objective reporting increased.
One reform that would ease tensions regardless of any structural changes would
be an economic union between Syria, Iraq and Lebanon. Negotiation of such an
agreement would force economic changes in all three countries. It would allow for the
large number of highly educated Lebanese into areas of economic development in
rebuilding war torn Iraq and Syria all the while incorporating strategies to link the
infrastructure and economies of the three nations. Funding would need to be sought
mostly from outside sources as all three of the countries have high debt to GDP ratios
with Lebanon’s being the largest. Despite the potential risks to security, such an idea
would attract foreign investment, particularly western foreign investment. Not only
would the opportunity for returns be high, it would also serve to increase stability in the
volatile region of important strategic value.
There are however, numerous obstacles to the enacting all or any of the needed
reforms. Those who currently control the power in Lebanon are benefiting from the
current system would opposed to any such reform. Electoral reform as well would have
opposition from many factions, which might be worried about the potential ramifications
of dissolving the religiously based system. Any reform would need a wide based of
support, and engage the majority of the Lebanese population.
The benefits of these reforms would be self-evident and immensely beneficial for
the Lebanese population. Enacting the political, social, economic and structural changes
would significantly sectarian reduce tensions within Lebanon and allow for a stable and
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vibrant democratic culture to emerge over time. Without such reforms Lebanon and
Bosnia will likely remain in its current state of sectarianism and division for the time
being. The process that the Ta’if agreement began by ending the violence would allow
for the necessary dialogue to occur, providing for cooler heads to create compromises
between disparate groups.

PEACE AGREEMENTS AND REFORM- FINAL THOUGHTS
Peace accords cannot force reform; their ultimate purpose is to end the
bloodshed on both sides. What was accomplished in Ta’if and Dayton did just that;
helping to save the nations and the regions from further violence and escalation.
Peace accords separate groups in order to create a climate with which reform and
reconciliation can take place. The over expectations in regards to the effects of the
Dayton and Ta’if accords in the scholarship were huge. Scholars should rather
highlight the ways in which the agreements were successful in their mission of
bringing peace to nations fractured by conflict and the promise of future reform in
regards to nation building and the fostering of a democratic culture. It is from this
point where discussions can begin on meaningful progress. Reform that is informed
by a deep understanding of the historical divisions and both ethnically and
religiously can occur overtime. Reforms targeting the government structure,
political process as well as economic and social life is all needed for a lasting
progressive pluralism to take hold. Still this takes time; democratic culture in the
United States, France and other modern democracies continues to grow and evolve
based upon prevailing attitudes, changes in technology and the needs of an
increasingly global world. The building of national institutions, infrastructure and
the repairing of a fractured national identity also take time. Even when established,
the process is always in motion. Reforms would provide a way in which Lebanon
and Bosnia could better achieve this process and the peace accords were the first
and most important step towards this.
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